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This paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance, 
providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries. It finds that state-owned banks 
located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private 
counterparts, and that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks.  The paper finds no strong correlation 
between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Next, in order to test   
whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political 
considerations, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong 
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The purpose of this paper is to use a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and 
bank performance and to test whether politics plays a role in this relationship. We find that state-owned 
banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower profitability, lower margins, and higher 
overhead costs than comparable private banks. When we focus on industrial countries, we find a much 
weaker relationship between performance and ownership. Three papers that are closely related to ours are 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Mian (2003), and Caprio et al. (2004). There are, however, 
important differences between each of these papers and ours. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) use 
data for an earlier period and focus on foreign ownership. Mian (2003) compares performance across 
ownership groups without controlling for bank characteristics. Caprio et al. (2004) look at the correlation 
between ownership structure and performance but, rather than focusing on profitability, interest margin 
and costs, focus on bank valuation.
1 
   After establishing that state-owned banks located in developing countries are less profitable and 
have lower margins than their private counterparts, we test whether these differences are due to the fact 
that state-owned banks have a development mandate or whether politics plays a role. To do so, we check 
whether the differential between the performance of public and private banks tends to increase during 
election years and, as predicted by the political view of public banks, find strong evidence in this 
direction. This is the most interesting and novel result of our paper, and it is a useful addition to the 
literature on the relationship between politics and banking activities. In fact, while previous work focused 
on type and quantity of bank lending (Khwaja and Mian, 2005, Dinç, 2005, and Sapienza, 2004), this is 
the first paper that focuses on the relationship between politics and bank performance.  
Dinç (2005), who finds that bank lending increases substantially during election years, is the 
paper most closely related to ours. A useful way to compare our paper with Dinç’s (2005) is to consider 
that he focuses on quantities, while we examine both prices and quantities.
2 Focusing on prices allows us 
to separate supply shocks from demand shocks. This is important because, if the increase in the quantity 
of loans observed during election years is accompanied by an increase in the price of loans, then we 
                                                       
1 See Berger et al. (2005) for a survey. There are several other papers that study the relationship between ownership 
and performance, but they tend to focus on a smaller subset of countries. Studies of the relative performance of 
foreign versus domestic banks in industrial countries include DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Berger et al. (2000), and 
Vander Vennet (1996). Studies focusing on developing countries include Bonin et al. (2005) and Clarke et al. 
(2000). There is also a large literature on the performance effects of bank privatization (Megginson, 2003, and 
Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2003, provide excellent surveys of this literature).  
2 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the interest rate charged on bank loans but, as return on assets and interest 
margins are good proxies of mark-up, if one assumes that the cost of funding does not increase during elections, our 
measures of bank performance are positively correlated with the interest rate (i.e., the price) charged by banks.    3 
 
should conclude that Dinç’s (2005) results are driven by demand shocks and not political lending. If we 
instead find that the election year effect is accompanied by a decrease in prices, we can conclude that the 
increase in lending is indeed driven by a supply shock, a fact consistent with political lending. Our results 
support the latter interpretation.  
A third strand of literature related to our work focuses on insider/related lending (Laeven, 2001, 
and La Porta et al., 2003). While this literature has mostly focused on the behavior of private banks, it is 
possible that during election years state-owned banks increase their lending to state-owned enterprises 
that share directors or that have managers and directors belonging to the same political groups as the 
banks’ managers and directors. Khwaja and Mian (2005), for instance, show that Pakistani state-owned 
banks lend more to firms with politically connected directors. 
  
2. The  Data 
 
Our main source of data is the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope (BSC) dataset that provides bank-level annual 
financial information for 179 countries around the world (the version of the dataset used in this paper 
covers the period 1995-2002). While BSC includes a wealth of information on bank characteristics and 
bank performance, BSC’s target audience consists of financial analysts interested in looking at a small 
sub-sample of banks and/or countries, not researchers interested in conducting statistical analyses 
covering all the countries and banks included in the dataset. Hence, we had to carefully edit the data 
before being able to use them for our statistical analysis, and we believe that this is an important 
contribution of our paper. 
  As our paper focuses on commercial banks, we start by dropping Central Banks, Investment 
Banks, Securities Houses, Multilateral Government Banks, Non-banking Credit Institutions, and 
Specialized Government Financial Institutions, which reduces our sample from 143,564 observations to 
120,809 observations. Next, we eliminate duplicated information, mostly consolidated and aggregated 
statements (this is not an easy task; see the Appendix for details) and reduce our sample to 71,951 
observations. Finally, we use different sources to code ownership and track ownership history for banks 
that changed ownership status (the Appendix provides a list of sources). As coding ownership was a 
particularly time-consuming and difficult endeavor that required looking at one bank at a time (in some 
cases it was necessary to consult several sources in order to code and track the ownership history of a 
single bank), the cost of coding all banks included in the dataset would have been extremely high. Hence, 
we decided to adopt some cut-off points (described in the Appendix) under which a bank would not be 
coded. After eliminating from the dataset all the banks that we were not able to code, as well as banks   4 
 
with missing information for total assets, we are left with a total of 49,804 observations, corresponding to 
a number of banks that ranges between 5,464 (in 1995) and 6,677 (in 2002). 
In the dataset, we classify as public those banks in which public sector ownership is above 50 
percent and classify as foreign those banks in which foreigners own more than 50 percent of shares.
3 
However, in computing country-level foreign and public ownership, we follow La Porta et al. (2002) and 
use the actual fraction of shares owned by each shareholder. 
While confidentiality agreements prevent us from making the bank-level dataset public, we are making 
public a dataset in which we report characteristics and performance of public, private, and foreign banks 
aggregated by country and year.
4  
It is important to recognize that there are at least two possible problems with our data. The first 
pertains to the nature of BSC. As BSC is maintained for commercial reasons, one of its main limitations 
is the almost total omission of rural and very small banks. Furthermore, Fitch-IBCA only collects data 
from banks that publish independent financial reports. Hence, it may omit some branches and subsidiaries 
of foreign banks (Bhattacharya, 2003). The second problem relates to the reliability of our coding 
strategy. Although we were extremely careful in coding ownership, we had to code several thousand 
banks and, therefore, we cannot be absolutely certain that there are no mistakes in the dataset. We address 
these issues by checking whether our data are consistent with other datasets that were assembled using 
different sources and methodologies. We find that the correlation between our measure of public 
ownership and those assembled by La Porta et al. (2002) and Barth et al. (2001) is large (the correlation 
coefficients range between 0.81 and 0.86) and statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. 
When we focus on foreign ownership and bank concentration (here we compare our data with those of 
Barth et al., 2001), we find that the correlation coefficients are 0.71 and 0.94, respectively (they are both 
statistically significant at the one percent confidence level). These results are reassuring and indicate that 
our data are highly correlated with the findings of previous studies. 
Table 1 reports the number of observations and median values for our main variables of interest 
(the table includes all banks for which we have information on ownership and total assets) divided by 
country groups (we use the classification of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators) and 
ownership type. The industrial countries have the largest number of banks in the sample (6,550 banks and 
35,800 observations, corresponding to 72 percent of the total). In this group of countries, domestic private 
banks control 70 percent of bank assets, public banks control 10 percent of bank assets, and foreign banks 
                                                       
3 Throughout the paper, we will refer to private banks as banks that are owned by the private sector (they can be 
either privately owned or publicly listed) and to public banks as banks that are owned by the public sector. Hence, 
the adjectives public and private do not refer to whether banks are publicly listed. 
4 The dataset is available at http://www.iadb.org/res/files/data_ mpy.xls   5 
 
control the remaining 20 percent. Our data also indicate that in industrial countries domestic private banks 
have the highest level of profitability (measured as return on assets) and the highest interest margin.  
When we focus on developing countries, we find that domestic private banks control 48 percent of bank 
assets, and public and foreign banks 26 percent each. In this sub-sample of countries, we find that foreign 
banks have the highest level of profitability and interest margin.  There are, however, important 
differences within the group of developing countries. Latin America is the developing region with the 
largest number of banks, followed by Eastern Europe, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, 
South Asia, and the Caribbean. Public ownership of banks is prevalent in Asian countries and Eastern 
Europe and much lower in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. Foreign ownership of banks is 
particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also prevalent in the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia, and Latin America. Foreign banks are particularly profitable (compared to domestic banks in the 
same region) in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, and public banks have very low profitability 
(compared to private banks in the same region) in South Asia, East Asia, and Latin America.  
 
3. Regression  Results 
 
To describe the correlation between bank ownership and bank performance and test whether politics plays 
a role in driving this correlation, we proceed as follows: we start by estimating a simple model where we 
compare how ownership affects bank performance. Next, we test whether politics affects the relationship 
between ownership and performance by interacting an election dummy with the public ownership 
dummy. Finally, we check whether our results are robust to changes in the econometric specification, 
weighting strategy, and sample of banks included in the statistical analysis.  
 
3.1 Ownership and Performance 
 
To study the correlation between ownership and performance, we use bank-level data and standard 
indicators of bank profitability and efficiency such as return on assets (ROA), interest margins, overhead 
costs, and employment to estimate the following equation:   
 
t j i t j i t j i t j i t j t j i X FOR PUB PERF , , , , , , , , , , , ' ε γ β α η + + + + =      (1) 
 
where  t j i PERF , ,  is a measure of performance for bank i in country j at time t ,  t j, η  is a country-year 
fixed effect that controls for all factors that are country-specific (level of development, geography, 
institutions, etc.) and country-year specific (macroeconomic shocks, political instability, changes in   6 
 
regulations, etc.),  t j i PUB , ,  is a dummy variable that takes value one if in year t  bank i is state owned 
(we define ownership using the 50 percent threshold),  t j i FOR , ,   is a dummy variable that takes value one 
if in year t bank i is foreign-owned (private domestically owned is the excluded dummy), and t j i X , , is a 
matrix of bank-specific controls which includes two variables aimed at capturing the effect of the main 
sector of activity of the bank and two variables aimed at capturing the effect of bank size.
5  
Although our specification is similar to the one adopted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), 
there is a fundamental difference between our empirical strategy and theirs. As we are not interested in 
how regulatory and macroeconomic shocks affect bank performance, we control for all these shocks by 
including country-year fixed effects. The main advantage of our strategy is that we fully control for 
aggregate shocks that affect all type of banks in the same way, thereby eliminating most problems related 
to omitted macroeconomic variables and errors in the measurement of these variables.  
As some countries have more observations than others, if we do not use weights, our results 
would be driven by the countries for which we have a large number of observations. Claessens et al. 
(2001) address this issue by weighting each observation by  t j N , 1 (where  t j N ,  is the number of 
observations in country  j , year t ). We follow a similar strategy but weight each observation by the 
bank’s share of total assets in the country. This weighting scheme has the same properties as  t j N , 1  (it 
gives each country-year the same weight in the regression), but it better reflects the behavior of the 
banking industry and, if measurement errors decrease with bank size, produces more precise estimates 
(Levy-Yeyati and Micco, 2003).  
While we started with approximately 50,000 observations (Table 1), our regressions include a 
smaller number of observations (about 19,000). There are several reasons for this difference. First, while 
Table 1 uses all observations for which we have information on ownership and total assets, the 
regressions also require information on four other controls (interest and non-interest income, demand and 
total deposits) and BSC has several missing observations for these controls. Furthermore, in order to work 
with similar samples, we drop all observations for which we do not have data for ROA, Interest Margins, 
and Overhead Costs (we do not restrict the sample to banks that have information on total employment 
                                                       
5 To control for the sector of activity, we use non-interest income as a share of total assets (NONINT) and demand 
deposits as a share of total deposits (DDEP). The rationale for using these two variables is that NONINT tends to be 
higher for banks that derive most of their income from commissions, and DDEP tends to be higher in retail 
commercial banks. These variables are thus likely to differentiate retail commercial banks from institutions that 
operate in the wholesale market or derive most of their income from investment banking activities. To control for 
size, we follow Berger et al. (2005) and use both total size measured as the lag of total assets (measured in logs, 
LTA) and relative size measured as lag of the share of bank i’s total assets over total banking assets in country j, 
year t (SHTA). The first variable controls for economy of scale and the second controls for market power.  
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because we would lose too many observations.). Second, we eliminate countries with a small number of 
banks by dropping all country-years for which we do not have at least five banks and, to make sure that 
our results are not driven by the transition from one ownership structure to another, we drop all the bank-
year observations in which there is a change in ownership. Third, we exclude outliers by dropping the top 
and bottom 2 percent of observations for each dependent variable. Finally, as we use lags, we lose one 
year of observations.  
Table 2 reports our baseline results. As industrial and developing countries tend to have different 
coefficients (Micco et al., 2005, present a formal test), we split the sample and report separate results for 
these two groups of countries.  The first two columns focus on profitability. We start by briefly describing 
the set of control variables. Non-interest income is not correlated with ROA in the sub-sample of 
developing countries but is positively correlated with this variable in the sub-sample of industrial 
countries; the opposite is true for the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits. These findings suggest 
that retail banks tend to be more profitable in developing countries and that banks that have high non-
interest income (possibly wholesale/investment banks) tend to be more profitable in industrial countries. 
We find no correlation between absolute bank size (LTA) and ROA for banks located in developing 
countries, but a negative and statistically significant correlation for banks located in industrial countries; 
these results are robust to dropping the asset share variable.  The coefficients of relative size (SHTA) are 
always positive but never statistically significant.  
Focusing on the ownership variables, the first column shows that state-owned banks located in 
developing countries tend to have returns on assets that are much lower than comparable domestic 
privately owned banks. The effect is quantitatively important, indicating that the average state-owned 
bank has a return on assets that is 0.9 percentage points lower than that of the average private domestic 
bank. Considering that the average value of ROA in developing countries is 1.7 percent, this is a sizable 
difference.  When we look at industrial countries, we find no statistically significant difference between 
the ROA of public banks and that of similar private banks (at -0.048 the coefficient is also extremely 
small). Hence, the difference between profitability of public and private banks, which seemed very large 
in Table 1, becomes much smaller when we recognize that public and private banks are of very different 
sizes and tend to operate in different segments of the banking market.   
These results show that it is not necessarily true that state-owned banks are less profitable than 
private banks and are in line with Altunbas et al. (2001) who find that, in the case of Germany, there is no 
evidence that privately owned banks are more efficient than public and mutual banks. At the same time, 
our results do support the idea that in developing countries public banks are less profitable than private 
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banks. La Porta et al. (2002) find that in developing countries the presence of public banks has a 
detrimental effect on growth, but that in industrial countries there is no correlation between state 
ownership and growth. They argue that this result may be due to the fact that high-income countries are 
better equipped to deal with the distortions that arise from government ownership of banks. It would be 
possible to apply the same line of reasoning and claim that our results are driven by the fact that 
governance issues are less serious in industrial countries. An alternative interpretation is that in industrial 
countries public banks have ceased to play a development role and merely mimic the behavior of private 
banks, whereas in developing countries public banks still play a development role and their low 
profitability is due to the fact that, rather than maximizing profits, they respond to a social mandate.  
Our second result is that foreign banks located in developing countries tend to be more profitable 
than private domestic banks. Again, the difference is both statistically and economically important. The 
average foreign bank located in a developing country has a ROA that is 0.37 percentage points higher 
than that of a comparable private domestic bank (about one quarter of the average ROA in developing 
countries). In industrial countries, we find no significant difference between domestic and foreign banks. 
These results confirm the previous findings that foreign banks tend to be more profitable than domestic 
banks in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000, and Bonin et al., 2005) but that this 
is not the case in industrial countries (Vander Vennet, 1996).
6   
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 focus on net interest margin (to increase the readability of the 
coefficients, we are expressing the dependent variable as a percent). In developing countries there is a 
negative and significant correlation between net interest margin and non-interest income, but in industrial 
countries the opposite is true; the correlation is positive and significant. The share of demand deposits is 
always positively correlated with net interest margin, absolute size is negatively correlated with net 
interest margin, and relative size is positively correlated with net interest margin. These results may 
reflect increasing returns and the presence of some market power.  With respect to ownership, we find 
that public banks in developing countries have slightly lower margins (the coefficient is statistically 
significant but not very large) and that there is no significant difference between the margins of public 
and private banks located in industrial countries. When we focus on foreign banks located in developing 
countries, we find that their net margins are never significantly different from those of domestic private 
banks. In industrial countries, instead, we find that margins of foreign banks are lower than those of 
domestic private banks. However, while the coefficient is statistically significant, the difference is fairly 
small.  
                                                       
6 Berger et al. (2000) and DeYoung and Nolle (1996) find evidence that foreign banks operating in industrial 
countries are less efficient than domestically owned banks.    9 
 
In columns 5 and 6 we focus on bank efficiency, measured as overhead costs over total assets. 
Non-interest income and the share of demand deposits (a proxy for retail bank activity) are associated 
with higher overhead costs. Absolute size is negatively correlated with overhead costs in both developing 
and industrial countries. In developing countries relative size is negatively correlated with overhead costs 
but, in industrial countries, we find no significant correlation between these two variables. Focusing on 
ownership, we find that state-owned banks tend to have higher overhead costs than similar domestic 
private banks. The coefficients imply that public banks have overhead costs that are nearly 10 percent 
higher than the group average (which is about 2 percent in industrial countries and 4 percent in 
developing countries). The second row shows that foreign banks have much lower overhead costs than 
domestic private banks (about 15 percent less than the group average in developing countries and 10 
percent less than the group average in industrial countries).  
The last two columns focus on another measure of efficiency: total employment measured as a 
share of total assets (the dependent variable is the log of the ratio between employment and total assets, 
employment is measured in units and assets in million dollars). In developing countries public banks tend 
to have a higher employment ratio than domestic private banks (the difference is about 20 percent of the 
average employment ratio for developing countries) and foreign banks tend to have lower employment 
(the difference is about 35 percent of the group average).
7 In industrial countries, we find no significant 
correlation between bank ownership and employment.  
 
3.2 The Role of Politics 
 
The previous section showed that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to be less 
profitable and have lower margins and higher overhead costs than domestic privately-owned banks with 
similar characteristics. There are two possible explanations for this finding. Those who claim that state-
owned banks have a social or development role argue that these public banks are less profitable because 
they address market imperfections that would leave socially profitable but financially unprofitable 
investments underfinanced (Gerschenkron, 1962; Stiglitz, 1994).  Those who are critical of the role of 
state-owned banks instead claim that state-owned banks are inefficient because they are captured by 
politicians who are only interested in maximizing their personal objectives (La Porta et al., 2002).  Levy-
Yeyati et al. (2004) survey the existing literature and point out that it is extremely hard to use cross-
                                                       
7 Higher employment seems to be the main explanation for the higher overhead costs of public banks located in 
developing countries. If we re-run the equation of column 5 and control for employment, we find that this latter 
variable is statistically significant and, once we control for employment, the dummies for public and foreign 
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country data to test whether the behavior of state-owned banks is better reflected by the political or by the 
social/development view (see also Rodrik, 2005). Studies that use bank-level data find that politics plays 
a role in the lending decisions of state-owned banks. Sapienza (2004) studies the lending behavior of 
Italian banks and finds that state-owned banks are affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated 
with the bank. Khwaja and Mian (2005) focus on Pakistan and find that state-owned banks tend to favor 
firms with politically connected directors by lending more and allowing for higher default rates.  Dinç 
(2005) uses bank-level data for 36 countries (19 emerging markets and 17 industrial countries) and shows 
that elections affect the lending behavior of state-owned banks located in emerging market countries. In 
particular, he finds that during election years, state-owned banks located in emerging market countries 
significantly increase lending, but that this is not true for private banks. He also finds that elections do not 
affect lending of private and public banks located in industrial countries. Dinç’s (2005) specification, 
however, does not make it possible to determine whether the increase in lending is due to a shock in the 
demand or supply of loans 
In this section we check whether elections affect the relationship between bank ownership and 
performance by estimating the following equation: 
 
( )
() t j i t j i t j t j i
t j t j t j i t j t j i
X GROWTH FOR
ELECT GROWTH PUB PERF
, , , , , 2 1 , ,
, 3 , 2 1 , , , , ,
' ε γ β β
α α α η
+ + + +
+ + + + =
     (2) 
 
In the set-up of Equation (2),  t j GROWTH ,  is a variable that measures real GDP growth in country j and 
year t, and  t j ELECT ,  is a dummy variable that takes value one when country j is in an election year and 
zero otherwise (we use presidential elections in countries with a presidential system and legislative 
elections in countries with parliamentary systems). All other variables are defined as in Equation (1), and 
we also impose the same sample restrictions and weighting scheme used in the estimation of Equation (1).  
Our coefficient of interest is  3 α . This coefficient measures whether the presence of elections 
affects the performance of state-owned banks (the main effect of elections is controlled by the country-
year fixed effect) and can be used to test some predictions of the political view of public banks.
8 In 
particular, the political view would be consistent with a negative value of  3 α  in the profitability and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
ownership drop in both magnitude and level of statistical significance (PUB is no longer significant and FOR 
remains marginally significant at the 10 percent confidence level). 
8 Note that as we include country-year (as opposite as to country and year) fixed effects, the election dummy 
compares the effect of election with non-election years within the same country and not with non-election years in 
other countries.   11 
 
margin regressions, and a positive value of  3 α in the overhead regression (if political pressures increase 
the number of employees during election years).  We control for the interaction between ownership and 
GDP growth (again, the main effect of GDP growth is controlled for by the country-year fixed effect) 
because state-owned and foreign banks may have a differential reaction to the business cycle with respect 
to private domestic banks (Micco and Panizza, 2004). This would not be a problem if the business cycles 
were uncorrelated with the electoral cycles, but political business cycle theory suggests that such a 
correlation may exist (see Drazen, 2000, for a survey).
9 
  Table 3 reports our baseline results. Column 1 shows that, compared with domestic private banks, 
state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to be more profitable during periods of economic 
expansion and, as predicted by the political view, less profitable in election years.
10  The effect of the 
election variable is extremely large. Take, for instance, the differential between the profitability of the 
average public bank and the average private domestic bank located in a developing country in a year in 
which real GDP grew by 3 percent, the average growth rate in our sample.  If this is not an election year, 
the differential is approximately 0.9 percentage points (-1.7+0.03*26=-0.92). However, if this is an 
election year, the point estimates of column 1 yield a difference of approximately 1.5 percentage points (-
1.7+0.03*26-0.59=-1.51), a 60-percent increase with respect to the non-election year benchmark. In 
contrast, Column 2 shows that elections make no difference for the profitability of state-owned banks 
located in industrial countries.  
  We find similar results when we focus on interest margins. Net interest margins of state-owned 
banks located in developing countries tend to be higher in periods of economic expansion and lower 
during elections (column 3). Again, the coefficient of the election dummy is very large and indicates that 
the differential between the interest margins of public and private banks more than triples during election 
years (assuming 3 percent GDP growth, the two values are –0.26 and –0.8, respectively).  When we focus 
on industrial countries, we find that the main coefficient for the public sector dummy is positive (although 
not statistically significant) and the election dummy is negative, statistically significant and large (the 
differential goes from 0.02 in non-election years to –0.25 in election years). This provides some evidence 
that the political channel is also at work in industrial countries (a finding consistent with the results 
reported in Sapienza, 2004).  Columns 5 and 6 focus on overhead costs and find that election years do not 
affect these costs (either in developing or in industrial countries) and that, if anything, the developing 
country coefficient is negative (although not statistically significant). This indicates that the effect of 
elections on profitability is driven by lower margins and not by higher overhead costs.  
                                                       
9 The results are robust to dropping the interaction between ownership and growth (Micco et al., 2005).   12 
 
As Dinç (2005) focuses on a relatively small number of countries, it is interesting to check 
whether his results extend to our larger sample of sample countries. The last two columns of the table 
show that this is the case.
11 In particular, we find that state-owned banks located in developing countries 
do increase loans in election years (the magnitude of the effect is also similar to the one found by Dinç, 
2005), and we find no correlation between election and lending of state-owned banks located in industrial 
countries.  
While our results are in line with those of Dinç (2005) regarding the correlation between bank 
ownership and lending behavior in election years, we think that focusing on both performance and 
quantities rather than only on quantities allows us to better identify the political channel.  Suppose, for 
instance, that the demand for loans extended by public banks were to suddenly increase during an election 
year (perhaps because industries that benefit from increases in public expenditure during electoral years 
are more likely to use state-owned banks). Then, the increase of loans extended by state-owned banks 
would not be due to political control and mismanagement, but would instead represent the optimal 
reaction of a profit-maximizing monopolistic competitor facing an increase in the demand for its product 
(political inefficiency thus would be in the sector of the economy that increased the loan demand but not 
in the banking system). However, if this were the case, we should observe an increase in interest margins 
and profitability. As we observe the exact opposite (i.e., a drop in margin and profitability), we can 
exclude the demand shock story and conclude that the increase in lending documented by Dinç (2005) 
and in the last two columns of Table 3 is indeed due to the desire of state-owned banks to reduce margins 
and increase the supply of loans during election years. 
 
3.3   Robustness 
 
The purpose of this section is to test whether our results are robust to alternative specifications and sub-
samples. Our first robustness test has to do with the fact that our benchmark specification may not capture 
important dynamic and selection effects.  Berger et al. (2005) and Bonin et al. (2005) point out that in 
studying the correlation between bank ownership and performance, one should distinguish among static 
effects (i.e., the average difference between performance of, say, public and private banks), dynamic 
effects (i.e., the effects of change in ownership due to, say, privatization or foreign acquisition), and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The positive correlation between GDP growth and profitability is consistent with a potential counter-cyclical role 
of public banks (Micco and Panizza, 2004).  
11 We use the same definition of loans growth used by Dinç (2005).   13 
 
selection effects (i.e., effects that occur if there is a correlation between bank performance and the 
likelihood of an ownership change).
12 To address this issue, we estimate the following model: 
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where  t j i PUB STAT , , _  ( t j i FOR STAT , , _ ) is a dummy variable that takes value one if bank i is public 
(foreign) and did not change ownership in the period under observation (the excluded dummy is 
t j i PRIV STAT , , _ ). Therefore,  1 α  and  2 α  measure the static effects of public and foreign ownership 
expressed as a difference from the performance of private domestically owned banks that never changed 
ownership.  t j i PUB SEL , , _  is a dummy variable that takes value one for banks that used to have a 
different form of ownership but became public during the period under observation ( t j i PRIV SEL , , _ , 
and  t j i FOR SEL , , _  are defined in similar ways ).
13  Therefore,  1 β ,  2 β , and  3 β  measure the selection 
effects of public, private, and foreign ownership. Finally,  t j i PUB DYN , , _  is a dummy variable that takes 
value one after a bank changes ownership and becomes public and zero before this change in ownership 
occurs ( t j i PRIV DYN , , _  and  t j i FOR DYN , , _  are defined similarly). Therefore,  1 φ ,  2 φ , and  3 φ  
measure the dynamic effect of ownership change.  t j, η  and  t j i X , ,  are defined as in Equation (1). 
  Table 4 reports the results for ROA, interest margins, and overhead costs. In most cases, the static 
coefficients for public and foreign ownership are similar (both in their magnitude and level of statistical 
significance) to the ownership coefficients described in Table 3. The only exception is the coefficient for 
public ownership in the ROA regression for industrial countries. In this case, Table 4 finds a statistically 
                                                       
12 Our sample includes 9 banks that were made public (0.2 percent of the total number of banks, representing a rare 
event caused by bank restructuring in the wake of a crisis), 66 banks (1.2 percent of the total number of banks) that 
were privatized and acquired by domestic investors (60 percent of privatization took place in developing countries), 
and 137 banks that were acquired by foreign investors (2.4 percent of total number of banks, 65 percent of foreign 
acquisitions took place in developing countries). 
13 If a bank has more than one change in ownership, we use the last change (this is the strategy followed by Berger 
et al., 2005). If a bank was public, then sold to a domestic investor, and subsequently acquired by a foreign 
company, we assign value one to 
t j i FOR SEL , , _  and zero to 
t j i PUB SEL , , _  and 
t j i PRIV SEL , , _ .  Public banks that were 
acquired by foreign entities are classified as being selected to become foreign. In this sense, we are not 
differentiating foreign acquisitions of domestic private banks and foreign acquisition of domestic public banks. 
Including this differentiation does not affect our results.   14 
 
significant coefficient (however, this effect is still rather small when compared with that of developing 
countries). When we look at selection effects, we find only two significant results. The first indicates that 
banks located in industrial countries that are selected for privatization and acquired by a domestic investor 
tend to have higher overhead costs than private banks that never changed ownership type. The second 
indicates that banks located in developing countries that were acquired by foreign entities have lower 
ROA than comparable private banks that never changed ownership. The dynamic effect of privatization 
by domestic banks is negative and statistically significant for overhead costs in the sample of industrial 
countries and not statistically significant in the other regressions. This indicates that acquisition of public 
banks by domestic investors has no significant effect on profitability and margins but a positive effect on 
the efficiency (measured by cost reduction) of banks located in industrial countries.
14 In developing 
countries the dynamic effect of foreign ownership on profitability is positive but not statistically 
significant, the effect on margin negative and not significant, and the effect on cost is negative and 
statistically significant. In industrial countries, on the other hand, we find a negative and statistically 
significant dynamic effect of foreign acquisition on profitability but no significant effect on margins and 
cost. More interesting for our purposes is that controlling for selection and dynamic effects does not affect 
our basic result that public banks profitability and interest margin tend to be particularly low during 
election years.   
  After having established that our results are robust to controlling for selection and dynamic 
effects, we briefly describe a further series of robustness tests. The first battery of robustness tests focuses 
on the econometric specification. The second focuses on alternative weighting schemes. The third focuses 
on the sample of banks included in the analysis.  
  One concern with our baseline specification is that two of the main control variables (NONINT 
and DDEP) could be endogenous with respect to the performance indicators. Although the ideal way to 
deal with such a problem is to use an instrumental variable approach, we cannot do this because we do not 
have good instruments. As an alternative, we re-estimate our baseline model without including these 
variables and find that the results are similar to those of our benchmark regression in Table 3.  Next, we 
augment our model with a measure of liquidity and a measure of capitalization, our main result that 
profitability and margins of public banks drop during election years still holds.  
  As country-year fixed effects cannot control for shocks that affect the relationship between 
explanatory variables and dependent variables, we augment our baseline regressions with the interaction 
between the ownership dummies and a dummy variable that takes value one in years in which country j 
underwent a process of financial liberalization and the interaction between the ownership dummies and a 
                                                       
14 At least this is the case for the post-privatization average. Berger et al. (2005) find some difference between short-
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dummy that takes value one during banking crises.
15 Controlling for these interactions does not affect our 
basic results.   
To check whether our coefficient of interest captures something that happens around election 
years, we add two extra interactions using a dummy that takes value one in the year before the election 
and a dummy that takes value one in the year after the election. We find that profitability starts decreasing 
in the year before the election (the coefficient of PUB*ELECTt-1 is negative but not statistically 
significant), it reaches a minimum in the year of the election (the coefficient of PUB*ELECTt is negative, 
large and statistically significant), and then it recovers in the year after the election (the coefficient of 
PUB*ELECTt+1 is positive but not statistically significant). 
  We also check if there is a difference between democracies and dictatorships. Here we have no 
clear predictions. On the one hand, one may expect that the political channel should be stronger in 
democracies because the importance of elections is positively correlated with the level of democracy. On 
the other hand, the opposite may be true if one thinks that even dictators need to maintain some consensus 
and that, when compared with democratically elected politicians, dictators are more likely to be able to 
impose their will on the activity of state-owned banks. We find that the effect of elections on ROA is 
stronger in democracies (in fact, it is not statistically significant in dictatorships), but for margins we find 
no differences between democracies and dictatorships.  
  In order to check whether the weighting scheme matters, we estimate our baseline specification 
weighting each observation by  t j N , 1  (the same weighting scheme used by Claessens et al., 2001). Our 
main results for developing countries are basically unchanged. One key difference is that we now find 
that the PUB*ELECT interaction is no longer significant in the interest margin regression for industrial 
countries (questioning the idea that the political view applies to this group of countries). Next, we 
estimate our baseline model without using any type of weighting and, again, find that our results are 
robust to this alternative estimation strategy.  
  As our sample includes several small banks and these small institutions could add noise to our 
estimations, we drop all banks that have total assets below 1 percent of the total assets of the domestic 
banking system. This drastically reduces our sample but does not affect our basic results. We also see 
what happens when we restrict the sample to 10 banks per country and, again, find that the results do not 
change. We also check what happens when we relax the restriction of only including country-years with 
at least five banks. The results are unchanged.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
run and long-run effects. Unfortunately, our panel is not long enough to distinguish between the two types of effects. 
15 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness test.    16 
 
  Finally, we run separate regressions for each group of developing countries and check whether 
the results are driven by any particular region. We find that in five out of seven regions the PUB 
coefficient is negative (statistically significant in four regions) and in one region (the Middle East) 
positive but close to zero and not statistically significant. The Caribbean is the only developing region in 
which public banks seem to be significantly more profitable than private domestic banks. When we focus 
on foreign banks, we find that the coefficient is positive in six regions and negative and statistically 
significant in Latin America (a result that is consistent with what was found by Levy-Yeyati and Micco, 
2003). We also find that the PUB*ELECT interaction is negative in six regions and positive (but not 
significant and close to zero) in South Asia. While this experiment shows that there is some cross-
regional heterogeneity and that the results are sometimes not significant when we focus on one region at a 
time, it also shows that the results are never driven by one particular region and that this is especially the 




This paper finds that state-owned banks located in developing countries are less profitable than their 
private counterparts and that the difference between the performance of public and private banks 
increases during elections years. The main advantage of our estimation strategy is that it allows us to 
separate price from quantity effects and allows us to show that the previously documented increase in 
bank lending during election years is indeed due to an increase in the supply of loans by state-owned 
banks. Hence, our findings provide further support for the political view of public banks and corroborate 
previous findings by Dinç (2005), Sapienza (2004), and Khwaja and Mian (2005). 
As a note of caution, it is important to mention that our results do not necessarily imply that state-
owned banks play no role in development. In fact, the development and political views should not be seen 
as corner solutions without any intermediate possibility; it is possible that a development mandate co-
exists with some political lending. The key challenge for future research is to understand if, and under 
what conditions, the potential benefits of the development mandate can outweigh the inefficiencies and 
the potential for corruption generated by political lending.    17 
 
Appendix A. The Construction of the Dataset 
 
We obtained data for the 1995-1999 period from the June 2001 update of BSC and data for the 2000-2002 
period from the February 2004 update of BSC. In order to use BSC data for our statistical analysis we had 
to avoid duplications and code bank ownership and track ownership changes.  
 
Avoiding Duplications 
Our starting dataset (after dropping Central Banks, Investment Banks, Securities Houses, Multilateral 
Government Banks, Non-banking Credit Institutions, and Specialized Government Financial Institutions) 
consisted of 120,809 observations.  Our first problem relates to choosing whether to work with 
consolidated or unconsolidated statements.  We decided to work with unconsolidated statements because 
consolidated statements might end up duplicating the data (if bank A owns bank B, using the consolidated 
statement of Bank A would lead us to double count the assets of Bank B).  Therefore, in our empirical 
analysis we mostly use unconsolidated statements. If BSC reported both types of statements for all banks, 
we could simply drop all consolidated statements and end up with a sample that includes one observation 
for each bank-year. However, some banks only have a consolidated statement, while others only have an 
unconsolidated statement. Hence, dropping just one category would lead to loss of information. 
Therefore, whenever a bank does not have an unconsolidated statement (which occurs in about 10   
percent of cases), we use the consolidated statement.  
Dealing with different levels of consolidation is not straightforward. As BSC often uses a 
different identification number for each level of consolidation, it is impossible to use this identification 
number to keep the consolidated statements of banks that lack an unconsolidated statement. Fortunately, 
BSC has a variable called CTRYRANK (this is the ranking of the bank by total assets) that uniquely 
identifies a large number of banks and allows us to avoid duplication and retain one statement per bank. 
One problem with CTRYRANK is that this variable uses data for the last available balance sheet reported 
in each BSC disc. As we use discs that have data up to 1999 and 2002, we do not have this variable for 
banks that ceased to operate before 1999. This is a serious issue for banks that went through a merger or 
were closed because they had become insolvent. We address this problem by individually looking at all 
banks that have missing values for CTRYRANK and by assigning a code that uniquely identifies each 
bank in this subgroup.
16 This new code, together with CTRYRANK, uniquely identifies all the banks 
included in the sample. 
                                                       
16 In recoding non-ranked banks we looked at all observations but paid particular attention to all the non-ranked 
banks with assets greater than the country average.   18 
 
Another problem we faced in working with this large sample of bank-level data is that BSC 
reports balance sheet data at the aggregated levels. BSC builds aggregated statements by combining the 
statements of banks that have merged or are about to merge. Aggregated statements may then report the 
data of groups of affiliated banks that neither have financial links nor form a legal entity. Take for 
instance two banks (Bank A and Bank B) that merged in 1999. For the period 1995 to 1999, BSC would 
report balance sheets for three banks: one for Bank A, one for Bank B, and an aggregated statement that 
would add up the statements of Bank A and Bank B. Starting from 2000, BSC would no longer report 
data for Bank A and Bank B but only for the new unit that resulted from the mergers (sometimes this new 
unit will have the name of one of the two old banks and sometimes it will have a completely new name).  
This example shows that a given bank might be reported in BSC up to four times: as an independent unit 
by its consolidated and unconsolidated statements and as part of aggregated consolidated and 
unconsolidated statements. There are two possible ways to deal with banks that have aggregated 
statements. The first is to always work with the aggregated statement and drop the observations for the 
individual banks. The second is to drop the aggregated statement and work with the individual banks up 
to the time of the merger and then, starting from the year of the merger, with the new bank. We adopt the 
latter strategy.   
An example may clarify our procedure. Consider the case of INTESA, the largest Italian banking 
group. INTESA was created in 1998 with the merger of CARIPLO and AMBROVENETO. In 1999, 
Banca Commerciale Italiana (COMIT) joined the INTESA group, and in 2001 COMIT completely 
merged with INTESA, which took the name of INTESABCI. As of 2000, BSC reports data for (i) 
COMIT; (ii) AMBROVENETO; (iii) CARIPLO; and (iv) INTESABCI. Clearly, considering all these 
four banks would lead to a large overestimation of Italian banking assets. In this case, CTRYRANK 
variable can help avoid duplications, but we also need to use additional information. In fact, CTRYRANK 
takes value one for INTESABCI (recognizing that this is the largest bank in the country), 5 for CARIPLO 
and 12 for AMBROVENETO. COMIT is not ranked (CTRYRANK takes the value NR). Clearly, 
dropping the banks that are coded as non-ranked (COMIT) can help in preventing duplication but this 
does not solve all of our problems. First, the dataset would still include INTESABCI and two of its 
components (AMBROVENETO and CARIPLO). Second, the ranking variable refers to the last year, and 
hence if we were to drop all the banks that are not ranked, we would also drop COMIT for the 1995-1999 
period. To address this issue, we looked at one bank at a time, checked whether the bank was part of a 
merger event and, if this was the case, recoded the CTRYRANK variables in order to keep the individual 
banks up to the merger and then the new bank starting from the date of the merger. In the case of the 
example described above, we re-ranked (and hence included in the dataset) COMIT from 1995 to 1999 
and de-ranked (and hence excluded from the dataset) Ambroveneto and CARIPLO for 2000-2002 and   19 
 
Intesa BCI for 1995-1999. After dropping the non-ranked bank we end up with three banks (COMIT, 
Ambroveneto and CARIPLO) operating for the 1995-1999 period and one bank (IntesaBCI) operating for 
the 2000-2002 period. This strategy required a considerable amount of effort and led to a massive amount 
of recoding but made us confident that our dataset does a good job of tracking the main bank mergers. 
 
Coding Ownership 
Although BSC includes an ownership variable, this variable has limited coverage and does not track 
ownership history.   To code ownership, we started with the BSC data and then used different sources to 
code banks and to track ownership history for banks that were coded by BSC.  To track ownership 
changes, we started with the information available in BSC (there is a field with a brief history of each 
institution) and the privatization databases assembled by the World Bank, Privatization Barometer, 
Verbrugge (1999), Megginson (2003), Andrews (2005), Bonin et al. (2005), Beck et al. (2004), and 
Clarke and Cull (2002). Next, we gathered information on ownership status and ownership history from 
individual bank websites (several bank websites include a section that narrates the history of the bank). 
When the bank website did not provide enough information, we consulted various publications (including 
Euromoney, Bankers Almanac, American Banker, Bank Director, Pensions & Investments, ABA Banking 
Journal), performed several Internet searches, and consulted country experts.  
Coding ownership was an extremely time-consuming but fairly straightforward exercise because 
we had to make only two decisions. The first concerned whether to establish a cut-off point under which 
banks would not be coded, and the second had to do with the fact that banks are sometimes owned by 
other companies.  
Concerning the cut-off point, we started by coding the 10 largest banks in each country (the same 
strategy followed by La Porta, et al., 2002). Then, if these banks represented less than 75 percent of total 
assets of the banking system, we coded all banks up to 75 percent of total assets of the banking system.
17 
One thing that we did not do was to code private banks into family-owned (or privately held) and 
widely-held (Caprio et al., 2004, do this for a sample of 244 banks located in 44 countries). While having 
this additional breakdown of the ownership variable would allow us to conduct a series of additional 
                                                       
17 Even with this cut-off, a lot of time was spent on constructing the dataset. Coding ownership required two months 
of work of a full-time research assistant, plus the help of several other research assistants for a shorter period of 
time. In Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe and industrial countries (these are the regions with the largest 
number of banks), we coded the largest 20 banks and, again, if these 20 banks represented less than 75 percent of 
total assets of the banking system, we coded up to 75 percent of assets of the banking system. We also coded all 
banks that were not among the top 20 or in the 75th percentile but had an obvious coding (for instance, a bank 
located in Lebanon called HSBC was automatically coded as foreign), were included in one of the privatization 
datasets mentioned above or were originally coded by BSC (therefore, we tracked ownership history for all banks 
coded by BSC, independently of their size)   20 
 
interesting tests and focus on possible differences between the performance of family-owned and widely-
held banks, obtaining this type of data for all banks in our sample would require an enormous amount of 
work and go well beyond the scope of this paper.   
The second issue had to do with banks owned by other companies. There are two ways to deal 
with this problem. The first approach is to look at the nationality of the parent company and code the bank 
as domestically-owned if the parent company is headquartered in the same country as the bank, and 
foreign-owned if the parent company is headquartered in another country. The second approach is to look 
at who owns the parent company and then code bank ownership based on the ownership of the parent 
company. Following La Porta et al. (2002), we adopted the latter strategy. Whenever X percent of a given 
bank (Bank A) was owned by another company (Company B) and Y percent of Company B was owned 
by a foreign company (alternately state-owned), we coded Bank A as being X*Y percent foreign (state) 
owned (we always went back at least two steps in the ownership structure). When coding ownership of 
banks owned by foreign governments (for instance, an Argentinean bank owned by Banco do Brasil 
which, in turn, is owned by the Brazilian government), we also adopted the strategy used by La Porta et 
al. (2002), which classifies as state-owned only those banks that are owned by the domestic government 
and as foreign those banks owned by foreign governments. 
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Table 1: Number of Observations and Median Values 











total assets  Region  N. Obs.  N. Banks 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
32,301 5,918  Dom.Priv.  70%  0.75%  1.79% 1.79%  1.01 
374 84  Public 10%  0.42%  1.47%  1.16% 0.82  Industrial Countries 
3,131 552  Foreign 20%  0.55%  1.62%  1.69%  0.92 
8,611 1,817  Dom.Priv.  48%  1.39%  4.13%  4.19%  1.00 
1,831 391  Public  26%  0.94%  3.68%  3.21%  1.01 
Developing 
Countries 
3,912 697  Foreign 26%  1.71%  4.17%  4.15%  0.91 
293 76  Dom.Priv.  49%  1.56%  4.69%  5.51% 1.00 
67 9  Public  32%  1.88%  4.36%  3.51%  1.00  Caribbean 
134 26  Foreign  19%  2.78%  4.29%  3.48% 0.91 
1,416 281  Dom.Priv.  55%  0.95%  2.63%  1.90%  1.00 
408 87  Public 25%  0.54%  2.14%  1.36% 1.00 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
453 74  Foreign  20%  1.62%  2.98%  2.03% 0.86 
2,058 525  Dom.Priv.  44%  1.31%  4.65%  5.47%  1.00 
356 82  Public 33%  1.10%  3.94%  4.02% 1.08 
East Europe and 
Central Asia 
749 125  Foreign  23%  1.57%  3.83%  4.35%  0.78 
2,118 433  Dom.Priv.  52%  1.38%  5.11%  5.06%  1.00 
344 88  Public 19%  0.72%  4.84%  5.77% 1.05  Latin America 
1,682 315  Foreign 30%  1.19%  4.90%  5.03%  1.00 
1,049 178  Dom.Priv.  57%  1.40%  2.52%  1.84%  1.00 
245 45  Public 30%  0.93%  2.59%  1.76% 1.13 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
259 41  Foreign  13%  1.15%  2.22%  1.72% 0.92 
648 104  Dom.Priv.  34%  1.04%  3.08%  2.44%  1.00 
272 46  Public 56%  0.54%  2.69%  2.64% 1.02  South Asia 
59 8  Foreign  10%  1.68%  3.43%  2.07%  0.44 
1,029 220  Dom.Priv.  43%  1.85%  5.25%  4.92%  1.00 
139 34  Public 16%  1.77%  5.48%  4.47% 1.00  Sub Saharan Africa 
576 108  Foreign  41%  2.51%  5.88%  5.05%  1.00 
*All variables are weighted by bank size. 
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Table 2. Bank Ownership and Performance. Baseline Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  RETURN ON ASSETS 
(ROA) 
INTEREST MARGIN 
OVER TOTAL ASSETS 





PUB  -0.910 -0.048 -0.323 -0.054 0.383  0.177  0.197 -0.034 
  (0.114)*** (0.050) (0.099)*** (0.053) (0.090)*** (0.060)*** (0.052)***  (0.053) 
FOR  0.365 0.016 0.010 -0.207  -0.686  -0.174  -0.365  -0.082 
  (0.098)*** (0.035)  (0.085) (0.049)***  (0.095)*** (0.059)*** (0.052)***  (0.052) 
NONINT  -0.003 0.124 -0.041 0.053 0.478 0.738 0.018 0.089 
  (0.034) (0.010)***  (0.023)*  (0.018)***  (0.063)*** (0.047)***  (0.008)**  (0.014)*** 
DDEP  0.012 0.000 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.004 0.012 
  (0.003)*** (0.001) (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** (0.001)***  (0.002)**  (0.001)*** 
LTA  -0.038 -0.029 -0.236 -0.178 -0.150 -0.094 -0.001 -0.116 
  (0.052) (0.008)***  (0.043)***  (0.014)***  (0.044)*** (0.015)***  (0.023)  (0.012)*** 
SHTA  0.266 0.085 1.402 0.491 -1.022 0.067 -0.452 0.598 
  (0.457) (0.173)  (0.392)***  (0.189)***  (0.324)*** (0.201)  (0.261)*  (0.187)*** 
N.  OBS 5489 13329 5489 13329 5489 13329 1893  9757 
R2  0.5211 0.5222 0.7346 0.6253 0.7684 0.7896 0.8761 0.7196 
SAMPLE Developing  Industrial  Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share and include country-year fixed 
effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 3. Bank Ownership, Profitability, and Overhead Costs. Do Elections Matter? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  RETURN ON ASSETS 
(ROA) 
INTEREST MARGIN 
OVER TOTAL ASSETS 
OVERHEAD COST 
OVER TOTAL ASSETS 
LOANS GROWTH 
PUB  -1.740 -0.117 -0.644 0.066 0.412 0.408 0.244 0.208 
  (0.406)*** (0.087) (0.238)*** (0.096) (0.157)*** (0.135)***  (0.187)  (0.162) 
FOR  0.165 0.023 0.060 -0.132  -0.859 -0.022 0.212 -0.388 
  (0.171) (0.072) (0.127)  (0.080)*  (0.150)*** (0.087)  (0.201)  (0.252) 
PUB*ELECT  -0.591 -0.043 -0.565 -0.270 -0.142  0.058  0.339  0.099 
  (0.265)** (0.101)  (0.189)***  (0.110)** (0.251) (0.147)  (0.129)***  (0.121) 
PUB*GROWTH  26.185 2.631 12.696 -1.422 0.381 -7.762 -3.054  -6.051 
  (9.486)*** (2.300)  (5.022)**  (2.858)  (2.891) (3.814)** (1.906)  (4.019) 
FOR*GROWTH  5.256 -1.163 -2.244 -4.150 6.256 -5.863 -3.449 2.933 
  (3.964) (1.673) (2.955) (2.528)  (3.428)* (3.262)* (1.811)* (3.400) 
N. OBS  5256 13092 5244 13246 5269 13232 5196 13116 
R2  0.5329 0.4759 0.7345 0.6172 0.7633 0.7918 0.7712 0.7911 
SAMPLE  Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share, include country-year fixed effects 
and the controls of Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Selection and Dynamic Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  RETURN ON ASSETS 
(ROA) 
INTEREST MARGIN OVER 
TOTAL ASSETS 
OVERHEAD COST OVER 
TOTAL ASSETS 
ST_PUB  -1.604 -0.263 -0.787 -0.106 0.361  0.266 
  (0.377)*** (0.075)*** (0.227)***  (0.082) (0.139)***  (0.118)** 
ST_FOR  0.279 0.017 0.180 -0.157  -0.875  -0.041 
  (0.181) (0.073) (0.132)  (0.079)** (0.163)***  (0.086) 
SE_PUB  -0.053 1.084 -0.475 -0.201 -0.186 -0.580 
  (0.179) (0.471)**  (0.162)***  (0.270) (0.099)*  (0.247)** 
SE_PRI  -0.161 -0.099 -0.069 0.149  0.270  0.391 
  (0.489) (0.074) (0.376) (0.094) (0.535)  (0.104)*** 
SE_FOR  -0.494 0.098 -0.066 0.104 -0.111 0.100 
  (0.190)*** (0.070)  (0.146)  (0.099) (0.126) (0.081) 
DY_PUB  -3.593 0.000 -0.610 0.000 -0.211 0.000 
  (1.833)* (0.000)  (0.514)  (0.000) (0.399) (0.000) 
DY_PRI  0.066 0.013 0.130 -0.191  -0.414  -0.393 
  (0.528) (0.107) (0.450) (0.149) (0.584)  (0.126)*** 
DY_FOR  0.337 -0.314 -0.176 -0.128 -0.566 0.090 
  (0.248) (0.112)*** (0.229)  (0.125) (0.207)*** (0.122) 
PUB*ELECT  -0.743 -0.007 -0.546 -0.213 -0.103 0.117 
  (0.261)*** (0.096) (0.186)***  (0.104)** (0.247)  (0.152) 
PUB*GROWTH  21.785 4.829 12.952 1.364  1.615 -4.536 
  (8.601)** (1.889)**  (4.620)***  (2.322) (2.672) (3.028) 
FOR*GROWTH  3.978 -0.413 -3.102 -3.882 5.613 -5.895 
  (3.895) (1.613) (2.938) (2.396) (3.483)  (3.050)* 
N. OBS  5256 13092 5244 13246 5269 13232 
R2  0.5338 0.4858 0.7366 0.6194 0.7628 0.7923 
SAMPLE  Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by asset share, include country-year fixed effects and the 
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